A new countermeasure against side-channel attacks based on hardware-software co-design

This paper aims at presenting a new countermeasure against Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks, whose implementation is based on a hardware-software co-design. The hardware architecture consists of a microprocessor, which executes the algorithm using a false key, and a coprocessor that performs several operations that are necessary to retrieve the original text that was encrypted with the real key. The coprocessor hardly affects the power consumption of the device, so that any classical attack based on such power consumption would reveal a false key. Additionally, as the operations carried out by the coprocessor are performed in parallel with the microprocessor, the execution time devoted for encrypting a specific text is not affected by the proposed countermeasure. In order to verify the correctness of our proposal, the system was implemented on a Virtex 5 FPGA. Different SCA attacks were performed on several functions of AES algorithm. Experimental results show in all cases that the system is effectively protected by revealing a false encryption key.Peer ReviewedPreprin

Hardware architecture implemented on FPGA for protecting cryptographic keys against side-channel attacks

This paper presents a new hardware architecture designed for protecting the key of cryptographic algorithms against attacks by side-channel analysis (SCA). Unlike previous approaches already published, the fortress of the proposed architecture is based on revealing a false key. Such a false key is obtained when the leakage information, related to either the power consumption or the electromagnetic radiation (EM) emitted by the hardware device, is analysed by means of a classical statistical method. In fact, the trace of power consumption (or the EM) does not reveal any significant sign of protection in its behaviour or shape. Experimental results were obtained by using a Virtex 5 FPGA, on which a 128-bit version of the standard AES encryption algorithm was implemented. The architecture could easily be extrapolated to an ASIC device based on standard cell libraries. The system is capable of concealing the real key when various attacks are performed on the AES algorithm, using two statistical methods which are based on correlation, the Welch’s t-test and the difference of means.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

Online signature verification systems on a low-cost FPGA

This paper describes three different approaches for the implementation of an online signature verification system on a low-cost FPGA. The system is based on an algorithm, which operates on real numbers using the double-precision floating-point IEEE 754 format. The doubleprecision computations are replaced by simpler formats, without affecting the biometrics performance, in order to permit efficient implementations on low-cost FPGA families. The first approach is an embedded system based on MicroBlaze, a 32-bit soft-core microprocessor designed for Xilinx FPGAs, which can be configured by including a single-precision floating-point unit (FPU). The second implementation attaches a hardware accelerator to the embedded system to reduce the execution time on floating-point vectors. The last approach is a custom computing system, which is built from a large set of arithmetic circuits that replace the floating-point data with a more efficient representation based on fixed-point format. The latter system provides a very high runtime acceleration factor at the expense of using a large number of FPGA resources, a complex development cycle and no flexibility since it cannot be adapted to other biometric algorithms. By contrast, the first system provides just the opposite features, while the second approach is a mixed solution between both of them. The experimental results show that both the hardware accelerator and the custom computing system reduce the execution time by a factor ×7.6 and ×201 but increase the logic FPGA resources by a factor ×2.3 and ×5.2, respectively, in comparison with the MicroBlaze embedded system.This research was funded by Spanish MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033, grant number PID2019-107274RB-I00.Peer ReviewedPostprint (published version

Faking countermeasure against side-channel attacks

Peer ReviewedPostprint (published version

CIBERER : Spanish national network for research on rare diseases: A highly productive collaborative initiative

Altres ajuts: Instituto de Salud Carlos III (ISCIII); Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación.CIBER (Center for Biomedical Network Research; Centro de Investigación Biomédica En Red) is a public national consortium created in 2006 under the umbrella of the Spanish National Institute of Health Carlos III (ISCIII). This innovative research structure comprises 11 different specific areas dedicated to the main public health priorities in the National Health System. CIBERER, the thematic area of CIBER focused on rare diseases (RDs) currently consists of 75 research groups belonging to universities, research centers, and hospitals of the entire country. CIBERER's mission is to be a center prioritizing and favoring collaboration and cooperation between biomedical and clinical research groups, with special emphasis on the aspects of genetic, molecular, biochemical, and cellular research of RDs. This research is the basis for providing new tools for the diagnosis and therapy of low-prevalence diseases, in line with the International Rare Diseases Research Consortium (IRDiRC) objectives, thus favoring translational research between the scientific environment of the laboratory and the clinical setting of health centers. In this article, we intend to review CIBERER's 15-year journey and summarize the main results obtained in terms of internationalization, scientific production, contributions toward the discovery of new therapies and novel genes associated to diseases, cooperation with patients' associations and many other topics related to RD research

Hardware-software implementation of a McEliece cryptosystem for post-quantum cryptography

This paper shows the implementation on FPGA of a McEliece cryptosystem, which ensures the security recommendations given by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) for next generation of quantum-resistant cryptosystems. The proposed implementation provides more than 128 bits of quantum security using a public key of 2,097,152 bytes. The proposed system is based on a hardware/software implementation that uses an ARM Cortex-A53 core connected to a coprocessor through an AX14 lite interface. The complete system was implemented on a Xilinx Zynq UltraScale+ and it is able to decipher texts of 8192 bit-length is 47.39 ms.This work was supported by the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad in the framework of the Programa Estatal de Investigación, Desarrollo e Innovación Orientada a los Retos de la Sociedad, project TEC2015-68784-R.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

A new countermeasure against side-channel attacks based on hardware-software co-design

This paper aims at presenting a new countermeasure against Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks, whose implementation is based on a hardware-software co-design. The hardware architecture consists of a microprocessor, which executes the algorithm using a false key, and a coprocessor that performs several operations that are necessary to retrieve the original text that was encrypted with the real key. The coprocessor hardly affects the power consumption of the device, so that any classical attack based on such power consumption would reveal a false key. Additionally, as the operations carried out by the coprocessor are performed in parallel with the microprocessor, the execution time devoted for encrypting a specific text is not affected by the proposed countermeasure. In order to verify the correctness of our proposal, the system was implemented on a Virtex 5 FPGA. Different SCA attacks were performed on several functions of AES algorithm. Experimental results show in all cases that the system is effectively protected by revealing a false encryption key.Peer Reviewe

Hardware architecture implemented on FPGA for protecting cryptographic keys against side-channel attacks

This paper presents a new hardware architecture designed for protecting the key of cryptographic algorithms against attacks by side-channel analysis (SCA). Unlike previous approaches already published, the fortress of the proposed architecture is based on revealing a false key. Such a false key is obtained when the leakage information, related to either the power consumption or the electromagnetic radiation (EM) emitted by the hardware device, is analysed by means of a classical statistical method. In fact, the trace of power consumption (or the EM) does not reveal any significant sign of protection in its behaviour or shape. Experimental results were obtained by using a Virtex 5 FPGA, on which a 128-bit version of the standard AES encryption algorithm was implemented. The architecture could easily be extrapolated to an ASIC device based on standard cell libraries. The system is capable of concealing the real key when various attacks are performed on the AES algorithm, using two statistical methods which are based on correlation, the Welch’s t-test and the difference of means.Peer Reviewe

Design and Implementation of Scalable and Parametrizable Analog-to-Digital Converter on FPGA

The flexibility provided by FPGAs permits the implementation of several ADCs, each one configured with the required bit resolution and sampling frequency. The paper presents the design and implementation of scalable and parametrizable analog-to-digital converters (ADC), based on a successive approximation register (SAR), on FPGAs (field programmable gate arrays). Firstly, the work develops a systematic methodology for the implementation of a parametrizable SAR-based ADC from a set of building modules, such as the pulse-width modulator (PWM), external low-pass filter (LPF) and the analog comparator. The presented method allows choosing the LPF parameters for the required performance (resolution bits and sampling frequency) of a SAR-based ADC. Secondly, the paper also presents several optimizations on the PWM module to enhance the sampling frequency of implemented ADCs, and the method to choose the LPF parameters is adapted. The PWM and SAR logic are synthesizable and parametrizable, using a low number of resources, in order to be portable for low-cost FPGA families. The methodology and PWM optimizations are tested on a Zynq-7000 device from Xilinx; however, they can be adapted to any other FPGA

Finite element analysis of contact and friction A survey

SIGLEAvailable from British Library Document Supply Centre-DSC:m00/31078 / BLDSC - British Library Document Supply CentreGBUnited Kingdo